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Governments around the world are increasingly aware of the need to promote the creation of not 
just more jobs, but also better jobs. This paper provides new evidence and insights on changes 
(and lack thereof) in Japan’s labor market segmentation between the primary (good job) segment 
and the secondary (bad job) segment over the last twenty-five years. During this time, the 
Japanese economy transitioned from a high-growth era to the Lost Decade to a quiet recovery. 
Specifically, we take advantage of the Japanese government’s recent relaxation of its data release 
policy, and analyze micro data from the Employment Status Survey (ESS) from 1982-2007. 
First, the literature often defines the primary secondary segments, using information on whether 
or not a worker is on a fixed-term contract or on an indefinite contract. We provide new evidence 
that such a de jure definition of labor market segmentation is less useful than an alternative de 
fact definition—whether a worker is termed a standard employee (seishain) in the place of his or 
her employment. Second, using our preferred de facto definition, we confirm that the size of the 
good job segment relative to the bad job segment has been indeed falling steadily over the last 
three decades. However, when we take into consideration transition from self-employment to 
employment, the most significant compositional shift of the Japanese labor market over the last 
decades is found to be a steady and substantive shift from self-employment to the bad job 
segment. Such a shift is found to be particularly notable for women, dwarfing any transition from 
the good job segment to the bad job segment. We further find evidence that such a compositional 
change from self-employment to the bad job segment is likely to be a shift from one type of bad 
jobs to another type of bad jobs rather than from good jobs to bad jobs. As such, our findings cast 
doubt on the popular narrative of the steady deterioration of job quality. However, for one 
particular group of Japanese workers – youth – we find compelling evidence in support of the 
popular narrative. This is especially true for the progress that young women made in enhancing 
their share of standard employment during Japan’s high growth decade in the 1980s; it was found 
to be entirely undone during the Lost Decade. Lastly, we provide evidence pointing to 
globalization as a possible underlying force behind the changes in the compositional shift of the 
Japanese labor market. (JEL: J63, J64, J41) 
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How to create more jobs has been at the forefront of public policy discussions around the 
world. However, policy makers are increasingly aware of the importance of paying more 
attention to the issue of job quality (OECD, 2014).  This paper provides new evidence and 
insights on changes (and lack thereof) in job quality in Japan over the last three decades. We do 
so by taking advantage of the Japanese government’s recent relaxation of the data release policy, 
and analyzing micro data from the Employment Status Survey (ESS) over 1982-2007.  
According to the recent good job/bad job framework (see, for instance, Kalleberg, Reskin, 
and Hudson, 2000 and Kalleberg, 2011), “good jobs” provide workers with high wage/benefit, 
strong job security, control over own work, and opportunity for training and development, while 
workers on “bad jobs” receive low wage/inadequate benefit, are subject to weak job security, 
lack control over own work, and are afforded only limited opportunity for training and 
development.  Acemoglu (2001) also offers a theoretical model of the determination of the 
composition of “good jobs” and “bad job” in the economy.  
To describe “good jobs” and “bad jobs” in the Japanese context, we will need to begin 
with a somewhat detailed description of Japan’s celebrated High Performance Work System 
(HPWS). In Japan’s HPWS, first, front-line workers not only produce output but also engage in 
problem solving activities and generate valuable local knowledge through their collective efforts 
in team and share it with management. Workers also deal with local shocks often autonomously 
through collaboration among themselves. Second, to sustain the interest and desire of workers to 
take full advantage of such problem solving activities on top of their regular production 
activities, the firm often pays efficiency wage (high wage/benefits). Furthermore, the interest 
alignment between workers and the firm is fostered by (i) financial participation schemes by 
which the financial wellbeing of workers is more tied to the final wellbeing of the firm; and (ii) 
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information sharing mechanisms through which management shares important information with 
workers, and fosters their loyalty and commitment to the firm. Third, in the High Performance 
Work System workers are often provided with strong job security which will enable them to take 
advantage of the aforementioned opportunities wholeheartedly without fearing any job loss. 
Finally, careful screening and training are integral part of the High Performance Work System 
(see, for instance, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997).    
The High Performance Work System emerged first in Japan in the 1960s and diffused 
widely among Japanese firms in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Many firms in the West (in 
particular U.S. manufacturing firms) started to experiment with a similar system as part of their 
effort to match the Japanese challenge in the global market (see, for instance, Kato and 
Morishima, 2002 and Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003).1 
However, not all Japanese workers work under such a system.  There is a sizable pool of 
workers who works outside of the system and constitutes the secondary segment of the Japanese 
labor market. In fact, such secondary-segment workers often function as a shock absorber in 
economic downturns by being the first to let go and thereby ensuring strong job security of the 
primary segment workers. Such secondary segment workers are said to be paid lower wages, 
enjoy less generous benefit, less control over their work, weaker job security and more limited 
training opportunities than those primary segment workers (see for instance Koike, 2005 and 
Rebick, 2005).   
In short, the primary segment workers (who work under the High Performance Work 
System) and the secondary segment workers (who tend to function as a shock absorber to ensure 
job security of the primary segment workers) fit well the descriptions of “good jobs” versus “bad 
jobs” workers in the aforementioned good job/bad job framework .  
1 For more detailed analysis of the rise of the High Performance Work System in Japan, see 
Koike, 2005, Aoki, 2000, Itoh, 1994, Morita, 2001; 2005, Moriguchi and Ono, 2004 and Rebick, 2005).  
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One of the most popular narratives concerning trends in the Japanese economy is that 
Japan’s once celebrated HPWS with “good jobs” has become less pervasive due to technological 
change and/or international competition, and that there has been a significant shift of 
employment from the primary “good job” segment toward the secondary “bad job” segment. 
This narrative has been influential in Japan’s policy making and political discourse. For instance, 
the Japanese parliament passed three major Amendments to the Dispatch Act in 1999, 2006 and 
2015, in part motivated by popular demand for reversing the shift from “good jobs” to “bad 
jobs”. Furthermore, based primarily on this narrative, OECD has been repeatedly recommending 
the Japanese government to reduce the disparity between the primary and secondary segments of 
the Japanese labor market (see, for instance, OECD, 2006, 2008, 2012, and 2015). 
Rigorous studies of such labor market segmentation in Japan in the past naturally focused 
on the evolution of the primary segment relative to the secondary segment of the Japanese labor 
market over time, and provided evidence in support of the popular narrative—general shift of 
employment from “good jobs” to “bad jobs” (see, for instance, Asano, Ito, and Kawaguchi, 
2013).  
In this paper we demonstrate that prior discussions on labor market segmentation and the 
“shift of employment toward bad jobs” neglect an important change in the Japanese economy---
rapidly shrinking self-employment sector, and that once such changes in self-employment are 
taken into consideration, a distinctly different picture on the evolution of overall job quality and 
a more nuanced policy implication will emerge. Furthermore, we provide evidence pointing to 
globalization as a possible underlying force behind the trends in job quality of Japanese workers 
over the last three decades.  
Our study of job quality and labor market segmentation in Japan also has broader 
implications. First, our findings provide fresh insight on income inequality which has been 
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discussed extensively among scholars and policy makers around the world lately (see, for 
instance, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2011, Moriguchi and Saez, 2008, Moriguchi, 2010, Piketty, 
2014, 2015). The literature on income inequality in Japan often considers labor market 
segmentation as a major source of income inequality (see, for instance, Ota, 2006, and Ohtake, 
2008).  This paper makes a valuable contribution to one of the most important public policy 
debates of our time---growing income inequality by providing much-needed rigorous evidence 
on changes (or lack thereof) in the nature and scope of Japan’s labor market segmentation over 
the last twenty five years.  
Moreover, labor market segmentation has been blamed for income inequality not only in 
Japan but also in other industrialized countries (see, for instance, OECD, 2015). To this end, our 
findings on Japan can inform policy makers elsewhere, in particular in Europe where similar 
labor market segmentation tends to be pervasive.  
Second, one of the most pressing issues facing advanced market economies is to assess 
the long-term effects on their labor markets of the financial meltdown in the fall of 2008 and the 
subsequent Great Recession.2 To respond to the urgent need to inform policy makers on such an 
important issue, researchers have been undertaking various research projects. Reflecting the 
persistence of high unemployment rates in the U.S. and most other major advanced market 
economies, much of such recent research naturally focuses on job loss and long-term 
unemployment (see for example Farber, 2011; 2012, David and von Wachter, 2011; and 
Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender, 2012).  
 Thus far researchers have not paid as much attention to long-term structural effects on the 
labor market of the Great Recession. For instance, it will be of great relevance and interest to 
policy makers to find out whether the Great Recession resulted in a significant change in the 
2 Though the Great Recession in the U.S. officially ended in 2009, we refer to the ongoing 
economic stagnation with persistent high unemployment rates as the Great Recession in this paper.    
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nature and quality of jobs as opposed to the quantity of jobs. More specifically we address the 
question of whether the Great Recession results in the replacement of “good jobs” with “bad 
jobs.”3  
 Since structural changes such as the replacement of “good jobs” with “bad jobs” tend to 
occur gradually over many years, it is somewhat premature to study fully the long-term 
consequences of the Great Recession for the labor market structure. 
 Fortunately, there was another Great Recession across the Pacific two decades ago. At 
the end of 1980s, the financial and real estate bubble were burst rather violently in Japan, which 
set the country into a prolonged economic stagnation, or the “Lost Decade”. Some important 
differences between Japan’s lost decade and the Great Recession nothwithstanding, there are 
some intriguing similarities (Koo, 2008). A number of serious attempts have been made to 
contrast the Great Recession to Japan’s “Lost Decade” in the 1990s, in search for historical 
lessons with regard to the causes and consequences of such severe and prolonged recession as 
well as appropriate policy responses (see, for instance, Hamada, Kashyap, and Weinstein, 2011 
and Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). This paper provides the first rigorous evidence on changes in job 
quality (or lack thereof) during Japan’s Great Recession which began in early 1990s and lasted 
for a decade.   
 
2. Measuring the size of the good-job and bad-job sectors in Japan 
Measuring the size of the primary (“good job”) and secondary (“bad job”) segments of 
the labor market with precision presents a major methodological challenge. Fortunately due to 
3 The creation of “good jobs” and “bad job” during the Great Recession became a hot political 
issue during the last presidential election in the U.S. For instance, Governor Perry buttressed his 
presidential candidacy by often citing his strong job creation record in the state of Texas during the Great 
Recession, while his opponents argued that the bulk of jobs created in Texas during the Great Recession 
were “bad job”. 
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the aforementioned segmented labor market institutions in Japan, there are a couple of 
reasonable solutions in the context of Japan.  is a major challenge. The first method is based on 
the specific term of each worker’s employment contract, and defines primary-segment workers 
as those on indefinite contracts and secondary –segment workers as those on fixed-term 
contracts.4  
The second method is based on a custom in the place of each worker’s actual 
employment. Specifically if a worker is termed “seishain (standard employee)” in the place of 
his/her employment, he/she is considered a primary-segment worker. Otherwise he/she is 
deemed a secondary-segment worker.   
The first definition is based on the specific term (contract length) of each worker’s legal 
employment contract, whereas the second definition is based on a custom/practice in the place of 
each worker’s employment (or how the worker is actually termed in the place of his/her 
employment). To this end, we can interpret the first and second definitions as de jure and de 
facto definitions of the primary and secondary segments of the Japanese labor market.       
It matters greatly which definition we use in studying the size of the secondary segment 
of the Japanese labor market. We draw Figure 1 using time-series data from the Labor Force 
Survey. First, the size of the secondary segment of the Japanese labor market as a percentage of 
total employment will be substantially greater when we use the de facto definition than when we 
use the de jure definition. Second and perhaps more importantly, the size of the secondary 
segment (measured by the de facto definition) as a percentage of total employment has been 
4 As discussed in Kambayashi and Kato (2011a), prior to its 1998 revision, Japan’s Labor 
Standards Law prohibited Japanese firms from offering multi-year fixed-term contracts. Hence all fixed-
year contracts were one year or less. Since then Japanese firms have started to use multi-year contracts. 
To reflect this new regulatory environment, the Employment Status Survey (our primary data source for 
this paper’s analysis) modified its de jure definition of the primary sector labor force and include such 
multi-year contracts (typically two to three years) workers, beginning with the 2007 ESS. As such, strictly 
speaking, starting with the most recent ESS (2007), employees on indefinite contracts include a small 
number of employees on multi-year contracts.       
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rising steadily over the last twenty five years, whereas the size of the secondary segment 
(measured by the de jure definition) remained constant and only started to rise during Japan’s 
Lost Decade.  
Furthermore, in principle, it is possible for a worker termed “standard employee” in the 
place of his/her employment to be legally on a fixed-term contract (standard employees on fixed-
term contracts). Likewise, conceivably a worker on an indefinite contact is not termed “standard 
employee” in the place of his/her employment (nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts). 
As shown below, nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts have become increasingly 
popular over the years, and ultimately have outnumbered nonstandard employees on fixed-term 
contracts (often considered the most natural form of contingent work).5 The rising popularity of 
such hybrid types makes it important to take into consideration both definitions fully.  
To further demonstrate the importance of paying particular attention to the definitional 
issue, we estimate the effects on worker outcomes of being a secondary-segment worker de jure 
(legally on fixed-term contracts) and de facto (not called standard employees in the place of 
employment). 
We begin with a probit model of job loss rate and test whether being termed a standard 
employee in the workplace or being legally on an indefinite contract is more strongly associated 
with job security.6 Specifically we use the Employment Status Survey (ESS) for the most recent 
year (2007), and create a dummy variable, jobloss=1 if an employee lost a job as a result of the 
employer’s decision unrelated to his/her individual performance (such as downsizing and 
5 The relevant literature is relatively small yet rich in content (e.g., Houseman and Osawa, 2003, 
Ozeki and Wakisaka, 2006,  Honda, 2006, Esteban-Pretel, Nakajima, and Tanaka, 2011, Asano, Ito and 
Kawaguchi, 2013). However, on our reading of the literature, no prior study examines those hybrid 
groups and uncovers the relative importance of holding the title of “seiki no jyuugyouin” and being on 
indefinite contracts.  
6 Farber (2009) estimates a similar probit model for the U.S., and we apply a similar specification 
to our Japanese job loss data. 
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“recommended” early retirement; bankruptcy and plant closing; and poor business performance) 
during the previous year, 0 otherwise.7 The Employment Status Survey (ESS) is the Japanese 
counterpart of CPS tenure supplements of the U.S.8 Due to the prevailing practice of mandatory 
retirement in Japan which was originally set at 55 (and then raised to 60 in the 1990s and 65 in 
the 2000s), we focus on age 18 to 54.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics where fixedterm=1 if an employee was on a fixed-
term contract (as opposed to an indefinite contract) in the previous year, zero otherwise; 
nonstandard=1 if an employee was not termed a standard employee in the previous year, zero 
otherwise; female=1 if an employee is female, zero otherwise; age=years of age; ten0to4=1 if an 
employee’s tenure with the firm was less than 5 years in the previous year, zero otherwise; 
ten5to9=1 if an employee’s tenure with the firm was between 5 and 9 years in the previous year, 
zero otherwise; ten10to14=1 if an employee’s tenure with the firm was between 10 and 14 years 
in the previous year, zero otherwise; and ten15+=1 if an employee’s tenure with the firm was 
greater than 14 years in the previous year, zero otherwise; juniorhigh=1 if an employee’s highest 
educational attainment was junior high school in the previous year, zero otherwise; highschool=1 
if an employee’s highest educational attainment was high school in the previous year, zero 
otherwise; juniorcollege=1 if an employee’s highest educational attainment was 2-year junior 
college in the previous year, zero otherwise; university=1 if an employee’s highest educational 
attainment was 4-year university in the previous year, zero otherwise. Note that in creating these 
variables for employees who lost jobs, we use information on their previous jobs from which 
they separated.     
As shown in the table, the average annual job loss rate for Japanese employees age 18-54 
7 We focus on employees in this section, and hence self-employed individuals are excluded from 
the data. Our key results change little even if we include self-employed individuals as shown in section 5.      
8 One major difference between the ESS and CPS is its size. The ESS contains almost nine times 
more households than CPS.   
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was 3.7 percent in 2007. The proportion of employees on fixed-term contracts was around 7 
percent, while the proportion of nonstandard employees was over 20 percent. Around 40 percent 
were female. The average age was 38, and the majority of them were high school graduates.9  
Table 2 presents the probit estimates of job loss probability as a function of the 
aforementioned variables as well as other control variables (firm size, industry, occupation and 
location). Nearly all coefficients are estimated precisely. Most importantly the estimated 
coefficients on fixedterm and nonstandard are positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level, confirming that employees on fixed-term contracts and nonstandard employees are 
indeed more likely to lose jobs and therefore enjoy less job security. The marginal effect 
estimates for fixedterm and nonstandard suggest that being not termed a standard employee in 
the workplace is substantially more detrimental for job security than being on a fixed-term 
contract.    
As expected, employees with longer tenure are found to be less likely to lose jobs; and 
more educated employees are found to be less likely to lose jobs. The estimated coefficient on 
age and its marginal effect are positive and significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that once 
tenure is controlled for, older workers are more likely than younger workers to be mid-career 
hires, and thereby face weaker job security in Japan (Kambayashi and Kato, 2011b). The 
estimated coefficient on female and its marginal effect are negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. Once obtaining the status of standard employment and being on indefinite 
contracts, female employees are actually less likely to lose jobs than their male counterparts. We 
suspect that this may be due to sorting – those female employees who earned the status of 
standard employment on indefinite contracts in spite of various challenges associated with being 
9 Unfortunately we are unable to use the ESS for earlier years, for the labor turnover module of 
the ESS for earlier years does not provide data on whether or not an employee was nonstandard 
employees during the previous year.    
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female employees possess unusual gifts that are not fully accounted for by our set of control 
variables. At any rate, considering the rather small size of the estimated marginal effect of 
female, we may not want to overstate such sorting story.     
To confirm that our key finding is not gender-specific, we repeat the same analysis for 
male and female employees separately. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results for male and 
female employees. Reassuringly for both the male sample and the female sample the marginal 
effects on job loss rate of not holding the status of standard employment remain significant and 
considerably larger than the marginal effects on job loss rate of being on fixed-term contracts (in 
fact for female employees, the marginal effect of being on fixed-term contracts is no longer 
statistically significantly different from zero). As such, our main finding of the relative 
importance of holding the status of standard employment to being on indefinite contracts is 
upheld regardless of gender.    
Next we estimate a standard Mincerian wage equation with log of hourly wage as a 
function of a variety of individual and firm characteristics, augmented by fixedterm and 
nonstandard (two variables to identify the secondary-segment workers).10 As in the case of job 
loss, we show the results for all employees first (Table 5) and then for male and female 
employees separately (Tables 6 and 7). Good news about the wage regressions is that unlike in 
the case of job loss, we need data only on current jobs and hence we will not need to rely on any 
data on previous jobs from the labor turnover module of the ESS for which information on the 
status of standard employment is not available for earlier years. As such we are able to estimate 
the wage equation for 2007 as well as for earlier years (1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002). 
As shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficients on nonstandard are consistently negative 
10 As in the case of many surveys of individuals in Japan, the ESS collects only categorical 
earnings data. We calculate hourly wage by dividing median of each category of annual earnings by 
annual working hours which we also derived from two additional categorical data on annual working days 
and weekly working hours.         
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and significant at the 1 percent level for each year over the last twenty five years. In contrast, the 
estimated coefficients on fixedterm are much smaller and mostly insignificant. The size of the 
wage penalty for not holding the status of  standard employment has been considerable, rising 
from 16% in 1982 to 26% in 1997 and falling to 21% in 2007. Note that the estimated wage 
penalty for nonstandard employment is conditional on age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, 
industry, occupation, firm size, and location as well as female. The estimated coefficients on 
female are negative and significant at the 1 percent level consistently for all years. The gender 
pay gap is sizable even after controlling for age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, 
occupation, firm size, location, as well as fixedterm and nonstandard. In 1982, it was almost 40 
percent and has been falling steadily to almost 30 percent in 2007. Tables 6 and 7 again confirm 
that the relative importance of being termed standard employees in the workplace to being on 
indefinite contracts for wage is not gender-specific.             
Finally, in 2007, the ESS began collecting data on the incidence of company-sponsored 
training and development. We use the 2007 ESS and estimate a probit model of the incidence of 
company-sponsored training and development program – probability that an employee 
participates in a company-sponsored training and development program as a function of 
fixedterm, nonstandard and other control variables. Tables 8-10 present the marginal effect 
estimates for the overall sample, the male sample, and the female sample respectively. As shown 
in the tables, again what really matters is whether or not an employee is called a standard 
employee in the place of employment not whether he/she is on an indefinite contract or on a 
fixed-term contract. This is true regardless of gender. Specifically the estimated marginal effect 
of nonstandard suggests that after controlling for the same set of control variables, being not a 
standard employee makes an employee a 7 percentage-point less likely to participate in a 
company-sponsored training and development program, which is not trivial considering that the 
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likelihood of the average employee participating in such a training is about 42 percent.     
In sum, we find consistent evidence that insofar as worker outcomes (job security, wage, 
and training and development opportunities) are concerned, being termed a standard employee in 
the workplace matters much more than being legally on an indefinite contract. Put differently, 
being a secondary-segment worker de facto is much more strongly associated with weaker job 
security, lower wage, and less training and development – “bad jobs” than being a secondary-
segment worker de jure.11  
 
3. Did the composition of employment shift toward “bad jobs”? 
 Following the aforementioned good job/bad job framework, we expand the scope of the 
analysis to include self-employment (Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson, 2000). Specifically we 
divide the population aged 18-70 into the following groups: (i) standard employees on indefinite 
contracts (employees on the standard employment track and on indefinite contracts); (ii) 
nonstandard employees on fixed-term contracts (employees not on the standard employment 
track and on fixed-term contracts); (iii) standard employees on fixed-term contracts (employees 
on the standard employment track yet on fixed-term contracts); (iv) nonstandard employees on 
indefinite contracts (employees not on the standard employment track yet on indefinite contracts); 
(v) self-employed; and (vi) others (primarily those not in the labor force). 
 As mentioned earlier, much of the relevant literature on the Japanese labor market 
ignores the self-employment sector when studying the relative size of the secondary segment of 
11 We study job quality by focusing on the three main objective measures of worker outcomes--
wage, job security, and training/development opportunity. The concept of job quality entails other 
domains such as autonomy. An alternative and equally valid approach would be to ask the workers to sum 
up all relevant domains of their jobs themselves and come up with their own overall job satisfaction 
scores. Unfortunately there is no reliable data on job satisfaction for a sufficiently large representative 
sample of Japanese workers that allow us to examine job satisfaction for different groups of workers such 




                                                 
the Japanese labor market. As shown in Figures 1, ignoring the self-employment sector and 
focusing on non-standard employment as a percentage of total employment will lead to a rather 
obvious conclusion of a steady deterioration of job quality in Japan. However, as we will 
demonstrate below, the size of the self-employment sector has been shrinking significantly over 
time, and much of Japan’s self-employment can be considered “bad jobs”. As such, taking self-
employment into consideration can potentially lead to a vastly different conclusion on trends in 
the overall job quality of Japanese workers.  
From the ESS for 1982-2007 we calculate the proportion of each of the six categories of 
the Japanese population (excluding those younger than 18 and older than 80) for 1982, 1985, 
1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. Figure 2 shows such proportions including both male and female, 
while Figures 3 and 4 show them for male and female separately. First, overall the proportion of 
standard employees on indefinite contracts (who will be clearly identified as primary “good job” 
segment workers by either of the two definitions discussed in the previous section) displays 
rather remarkable stability over time (40.7 percent in 1982 and 38.3 percent in 2007). During 
Japan’s Great Recession, it did fall somewhat yet the magnitude of the fall was modest (42.7 
percent in 1992 to 37.9 percent in 2002). To be consistent, the proportion of nonstandard 
employees on fixed-term contracts who will be unambiguously identified as secondary “bad job” 
segment workers by either definition also remained relatively stable throughout the period. 
During Japan’s Great Recession, there was a corresponding moderate increase in the proportion 
of such secondary segment workers from 6.1 to 8.1 percent.  
 The most noticeable shift, however, took place among self-employed and nonstandard 
employees on indefinite contracts. Self-employed workers as a percentage of the population aged 
19-70 were over 20 percent in 1982 and since then they declined precipitously and reached 
below 12 percent by 2007. In contrast Figure 2 shows a remarkable increase in the proportion of 
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nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts. In 1982 such a hybrid type was almost non-
existent yet by 2007 it reached the prominent status of 13 percent which actually exceeded the 
prevalence of self-employed. As shown in the previous section, being a secondary-segment 
worker de facto is far more strongly associated with weaker job security, lower wage, and less 
training and development – “bad jobs” than being a secondary-segment worker de jure. Thus, we 
determine that nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts -- the rapidly rising hybrid type is 
much closer to “bad jobs”. 
 When we disaggregate Figure 2 by gender, a sharper picture on the sources of the decline 
in the relative importance of the “good job” sector emerges. For the male population, as shown in 
Figure 3, there is no downward trend in the relative importance of the good job sector. 
Furthermore, rather astonishingly during Japan’s Lost Decade standard employees on indefinite 
contracts as a percentage of the population aged 18-70 did not fall at all (actually rose from 58.3 
in 1992 to 58.9 percent in 2002). Insofar as male workers are concerned, evidence does not 
support the popular narrative of significant shift of the Japanese labor force from the primary to 
the secondary segment. Note that the share of male standard employees on indefinite contracts 
subsequently fell during Japan’s longest uninterrupted positive (though modest) growth in the 
postwar era and reached 53.4 percent in 2007 and that correspondingly the aforementioned 
hybrid (nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts) surged from 2.9 percent in 2002 to 7.2 
percent in 2007.  
 Figure 4 (as contrasted to Figure 3) reveals some intriguing gender differences. During 
the decade preceding its Great Recession (the heyday of the “Japanese miracle”), Japanese 
women increased their entry into the primary segment steadily (the percentage of female 
standard employees on indefinite contracts rose from 23.8 in 1982 to 26.6 percent in 1992). 
However, during the Great Recession, they lost what they had gained and the proportion of 
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female standard employees on indefinite contracts fell from 26.6 in 1992 to 22.1 in 2002. There 
was a corresponding increase in the proportion of the hybrid (nonstandard employees on 
indefinite contracts) from 8.6 to 13.9 percent.  
Meanwhile, self-employment as a percentage of the female population has been falling 
steadily over the last twenty five years from close to 20 percent in 1982 down to 8 percent in 
2007. Back in 1982 self-employment was the second most common mode of work for women, 
and nonstandard employment on indefinite contracts was almost unheard of. By 2007, they 
traded places completely--nonstandard employment on indefinite contracts became the second 
most common mode of work for women after standard employment on indefinite contracts, 
whereas self-employment became one of the least common modes of work for women.  
As discussed before, the recent literature on contingent work in Japan often ignores the 
steadily diminishing importance of self-employment over the last twenty five years. An increase 
in nonstandard employment does not necessarily mean a decrease in standard employment. In the 
case of Japanese women, in 1992 (the beginning of Japan’s Lost Decade), nonstandard 
employment (including both indefinite and fixed-term contracts) constituted 17 percent of the 
total female population aged 18-70. By the end of the Lost Decade, nonstandard employment as 
a percentage of the total female population rose to almost 25 percent. In other words, during 
Japan’s Lost Decade, nonstandard employment rose by 8 percentage points. However, it does not 
mean that standard employment as a percentage of the total population fell by 8 percentage 
points. It actually declined only by 4.5 percentage points. Much of the discrepancy was due to a 
considerable fall in self-employment.  
 
4. Is substitution of nonstandard employment for self-employment a shift toward “bad jobs”? 
As shown in the previous section, a shift from standard employment to nonstandard 
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employment can be legitimately considered a shift from “good jobs” to “bad jobs”. However, a 
shift from self-employment to nonstandard employment does not necessarily mean a shift from 
“good jobs” to “bad jobs”, and it may well be a movement from “bad jobs” to “bad jobs”, as 
stipulated in the good job/bad job framework (Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson, 2000).  
To shed light on the nature of the aforementioned shift of the female population from 
self-employment to nonstandard employment, we use all female workers including self-
employed, and estimate a Mincerian earnings equation. Note that we focus on the female 
population since the compositional shift from self-employment to nonstandard employment is far 
more important among women than among men. The dependent variable is log of hourly 
earnings and our key independent variables are a set of four dummy variables: (i) “nonstandard 
and fixed” which takes a value of one if the female worker is a nonstandard employee on a fixed 
contract, zero otherwise; (ii) “nonstandard and indefinite” which takes a value of one if the 
female worker is a nonstandard employee on an indefinite contract, zero otherwise; (iii) 
“standard and fixed” which takes a value of one if the female worker is a standard employee on a 
fixed contract, zero otherwise; and (iv) “self-employed” which takes a value of one if the female 
worker is self-employed, zero otherwise (the omitted reference is “standard and indefinite” 
which takes a value of one if the female worker is a standard employee on an indefinite contract, 
zero otherwise). As in the case of the previous section, we control for age, age2, tenure, tenure2, 
education, industry, occupation, firm size, and location.  
The results are summarized in Table 11. The estimated coefficients on the employment 
status dummy variables are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated 
coefficients on “self-employed” and “nonstandard and indefinite” suggest that for all years 
except for 1992 self-employed women on average earns (per hour) significantly less than women 
who are nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts, after controlling for a variety of 
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individual and firm characteristics.12 For instance, in 2007, self-employed women earned over 40 
percent less than female standard employees on indefinite contracts, while female nonstandard 
employees on indefinite contracts earned about 20 percent less than female standard employees 
on indefinite contracts. As such, in 2007, substitution of nonstandard employment on indefinite 
contracts for self-employment represented a rise (rather than a fall) of hourly earnings.  
However, hourly earnings may not be entirely comparable between self-employed and 
employed women. As such, the above conclusion ought not to be considered definitive. 
Nonetheless, our analysis at least suggests that the compositional shift from self-employment to 
nonstandard employment among Japanese women over the last twenty five years may not be a 
shift from good jobs to bad jobs, rather a change from one type of bad jobs to another type of bad 
jobs.13 
Finally, we explore to what extent the aforementioned compositional shift from self-
employment to nonstandard employment on indefinite contracts among Japanese women results 
from the direct transition of the same women from self-employment to nonstandard employment 
on indefinite contracts. To shed light on this, we pool all years of the ESS and create an annual 
transition matrix (Table 12).  As shown in the table, the most common destination for women 
who transition from self-employment is non-employment. More importantly the direct transition 
of the same women from self-employment to nonstandard employment on indefinite contracts is 
rare (Since employees on indefinite contracts include both standard and nonstandard employees 
on indefinite contracts, the fraction of self-employed job changers who transitioned to 
12 The estimated coefficients on self-employed are found to be statistically significantly different 
from those on nonstandard and indefinite.   
13 We also ran similar regressions, using hours worked instead of log of hourly earnings as the 
dependent variable. Conditional on a variety of individual and firm characteristics, nonstandard 
employees on indefinite contracts are found to work significantly fewer hours than standard employees on 
indefinite contracts, whereas self-employed women are found to work as many hours as standard 
employees on indefinite contracts.    
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nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts are even smaller).14  The aforementioned 
compositional shift from self-employment to nonstandard employment on indefinite contract 
does not seem to be a result of the direct transitions of the same women from self-employment to 
nonstandard employment. Rather it is more consistent with an intergenerational transition--aging 
women working for their small family businesses (such as selling rice balls, candies, and soft 
drinks at their corner stores) retire (and hence transition to non-employment), while a growing 
number of younger women enter the labor market as nonstandard employees on indefinite 
contracts, as shown in the next section.    
It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the underlying causes of the compositional 
shift of female employment from self-employment to nonstandard employment on indefinite 
contracts. We speculate that the replacement of small family businesses with large corporations 
may be the underlying cause of the observed compositional change in female employment from 
self-employment to nonstandard employment on indefinite contracts. For instance, it is plausible 
that large retail chains (e.g., Seven Elevens) have been replacing small mom and pop stores, and 
that aging women working for such family businesses as self-employed workers retire and close 
their mom and pop stores.15 Meanwhile, their daughters work for large retail chains as “part-
timers” who are non-standard employees yet are on indefinite contracts. Such “part timers” are 
expected to work for the firm for an extended length of time yet receive lower wage with limited 
benefits, enjoy less job security, and often do not qualify for a variety of HRM programs (e.g., 
training and development programs) that are open only to standard employees. To shed light on 
this, we calculate the change in the proportion of nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts 
from 1982 to 2002 and the change in the proportion of self-employment over the same time 
14 The ESS does not allow us to separate job changers who transitioned to nonstandard employees 
on indefinite contracts from job changers who transitioned to standard employees on indefinite contracts.  
15 A similar story was presented and documented by Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Krizan (2010).  
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period for different industries, and plot them in Figure 5. The scatter diagram points to a negative 
correlation between the change in the proportion of nonstandard employees on indefinite 
contracts from 1982 to 2002 and the change in the proportion of self-employment over the same 
time period. As such, those industries with large reductions in the proportion of self-employment 
over the 20 years period appear to be also those with large increases in the proportion of 
nonstandard employment with indefinite contracts. In other words, the compositional change of 
employment from self-employment to nonstandard employment may well be taking place largely 
within the industry. Such within-industry changes are consistent with our speculation that the 
changing market structure of some industries from mom and pop stores to large oligopolists may 
be behind the observed shift of women from self-employment to nonstandard employment.      
 
5. What about youth? 
 Finally, another popular narrative with regard to the victims of Japan’s Lost Decade 
concerns youth (see, for instance, Genda, 2003). To this end, we repeat the same analysis, 
limiting the sample to the relevant youth population aged 22-30. Figures 6-8 summarize the 
results. Overall, we find evidence in favor of this popular narrative. As shown in Figure 5, among 
youth, there was a ten-percentage point drop in standard employees on indefinite contracts as a 
percentage of the population during the Great Recession (63.5 in 1992 to 53.8 percent in 2002). 
There was a corresponding rise in nonstandard employees on indefinite contracts as well as 
nonstandard employees on fixed-term contract.  Japan’s Lost Decade was indeed accompanied 
by a shift of the composition of youth employment toward “bad jobs.”  
 An intriguing historical gender difference is revealed in Figures 6 and 7. Among male 
youth, the proportion of standard employees on indefinite contracts remained quite high around 
76-77 percent during Japan’s growth decade preceding the Lost Decade. During the Lost Decade, 
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however, it declined by about 10 percentage points, and during the post-Lost Decade recovery 
period, there was no recovery in the proportion of standard employees on indefinite contracts. In 
contrast, during Japan’s growth decade of 1982-1992, young women in Japan had a significant 
stride toward “good jobs” – standard employees on indefinite contracts as a percentage of the 
relevant population rose by about ten percentage points from below 40 percent in 1982 to close 
to 50 percent in 1992. It appears as if nearly all of such gains were lost during Japan’s Lost 
Decade. Meanwhile, nonstandard employment (including both indefinite and fixed contract jobs) 
as a percentage of the population surged from 6.2 to 14.6 percent and from 6.4 to 10.7 percent 
respectively.  
In sum, it is the case that for both genders the composition of youth employment shifted 
significantly toward “bad jobs” during Japan’s Great Recession. For young women in Japan, 
such a loss of “good jobs” during Japan’s Great Recession meant a complete undoing of progress 
they had made during the preceding decade.       
 
6. Is Globalization a Possible Culprit? 
 In this section we explore globalization as a possible underlying force behind the 
compositional shift of the Japanese labor market as documented in the previous sections---rising 
non-standard employment and falling self-employment. The literature on the use of contingent 
work such as non-standard employment often argues that the firm is more likely to use such 
alternative work arrangements when faced with intensified competition which leads to rising 
need to reduce cost and increase flexibility, or timely labor input adjustment. In addition, such 
alternative employment arrangements are more pervasive among firms for which it is easier and 
less costly to observe and monitor worker performance (see, for instance, Houseman, Kalleberg 
and Erickcek, 2003; Cappelli and Keller, 2013).  
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Moreover, the literature sometimes suggests without providing rigorous evidence that 
globalization can be an underlying force for rising non-standard employment and deteriorating 
job quality (see, for instance, Houseman and Osawa, 2003, Kim and Kim, 2003, Kalleberg and 
Hewison, 2013). In essence, as the domestic market becomes more liberalized and foreign firms 
with more flexible work arrangements compete more intensively for the same customers, 
Japanese firms that traditionally rely more on stable standard employment are forced to increase 
the use of non-standard employment.  
 To explore if the documented shift of the composition of the Japanese labor market has 
something to do with globalization, using ESS 1982-2002 we first combine industry groups (2-
digit) with occupation groups (1-digit), and create 258 unique combinations of industry and 
occupation groups which we call “jobs” henceforth.16  Using jobs as the unit of analysis, we 
estimate the following equation: 
 (1)𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where nonstandardit=the proportion of non-standard employees of job i in year t; tradejt=the 
degree of exposure to globalization of industry j in year t; capitaljt=capital stock of industry j in 
year t; and taskit=task scores of job i in year t. For tradejt, we use industry-level data from Japan 
Industrial Productivity Database 2015 (JIP 2015) and calculate importjt=import as a share of final 
demand for industry j in year t and exportjt=export as a share of total output for industry j in year 
t. To control for technological changes (capitaljt), we again use JIP 2015 and calculate IT stock 
per employee of industry i in year t and non-IT stock per employee of industry i in year t. To 
further control for possible changes in the nature of jobs over time, we consider job i’s task score 
in year t (see appendix for the construction of task score).  We consider taskit for the following 
16 Unfortunately ESS does not allow for more detailed industry and occupation classifications.  
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three broad categories of tasks: Routine tasks, Non-routine manual tasks, and Non-routine 
analytical/interaction tasks.  To account for unobserved heterogeneity of jobs, we include job 
fixed effects. Lastly year effects are included in order to control for any shocks that are common 
to all jobs.  
 As discussed in previous sections, the rising share of non-standard employment is 
negatively correlated with the falling share of self-employment. It is plausible that the increasing 
availability of workers who exit from the self-employment sector makes it easier for Japanese 
firms to increase the use of non-standard employment. To see if our fixed effect estimates of Eq. 
(1) change, we augment Eq. (1) with selfemployedit=the proportion of self-employed of job i in 
year t.  
 (2)𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) +(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
It turns out that the compositional shift of employment over the last twenty five years 
varies greatly from highly unskilled jobs to highly skilled jobs. We use ESS 1982 and calculate 
mean education level of all workers for each job, and based on each job’s mean education level 
we group all jobs into the five categories, 1st bin to 5th bin. For example, 1st bin contains all jobs 
with their mean education levels are below the tenth quintile of education level of all workers. 
All five bins have an equal size of employment. Note that the number of jobs for each bin differs 
since the employment size of each job varies substantially.  
Figure 9 shows vividly that the rising non-standard employment and the falling self-
employment are far from common trends across jobs of differing educational levels. The falling 
self-employment is largely a phenomenon of the most unskilled jobs, whereas the rising non-
standard employment does not apply to the most skilled jobs as well as the least skilled jobs.  
Based on the observed considerable heterogeneity of the compositional shift of 
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employment among jobs with different skill/educational levels, we expect that interplay between 
globalization and changes in the incidence of non-standard employment may be also 
heterogeneous among jobs with different skills/educational levels. To this end, we estimate Eq. 
(1) as well as Eq. (2) for each of the five job groups (1st bin to 5th bin) separately.  
Table 13 presents the fixed effect estimates of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) when we use importit 
for the trade variable. The estimated coefficients on importit for the baseline model without 
selfemployedit are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the least skilled 
job (1st bin) and at the 1 percent level for the second least skilled job (2nd bin). It suggests that for 
unskilled jobs, rising competition from import is significantly associated with rising non-
standard employment. Note that the observed positive and significant association between 
globalization (measured by import) and the rising non-standard employment for unskilled jobs is 
conditional on the task characteristics of these jobs. In other words, workers performing those 
unskilled jobs are more likely to be non-standard employees when their industries are faced with 
greater competition from import even if what they actually do in their jobs (tasks) is unchanged.  
The estimated coefficients on importit for those unskilled jobs are not only statistically 
significant but also economically meaningful. For instance, for the least skilled job, based on 
changes in mean values of import from 1982 to 2002 and the estimated coefficients, we calculate 
that close to 30 percent of changes in nonstandardit from 1982 to 2002 can be explained by 
changes in importit.  
In contrast, no such significant association between globalization (measured by import) 
and the proportion of non-standard employment is found for the other three job groups. It 
suggests that exposure to greater competition from import may lead to the rising incidence of 




When adding selfemployedit, the estimated coefficients on importit for the least skilled 
and second least skilled jobs remain positive and statistically significant, pointing to the 
robustness of the positive association between globalization measured by import and non-
standard employment for unskilled jobs. As expected, the size of the coefficients falls when we 
account for the negative association between selfemployedit and nonstandardit. For example, for 
the least skilled jobs, the estimated coefficient on importit now accounts for 18 percent rather 
than close to 30 percent of total changes in nonstandardit.  
The fixed effect estimates of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) with export as the trade variable are 
shown in Table 14. Unlike import, the estimated coefficients on export are estimated with less 
precision, providing little coherent story. It appears as if changes in exposure to overseas market 
have less to do with the incidence of non-standard employment than changes in competition from 
import in the domestic market. Finally we consider both import and export simultaneously. 
Reassuringly our key results on import are found to change little even when we consider export 
together with import.  
 
7. Concluding remarks: Summary, Interpretations, and Policy Implications 
 Taken advantage of the Japanese government’s recent relaxation of the data release 
policy, we have provided fresh evidence on one of the most commonly-held and influential view 
on changes in the Japanese economy—the deterioration of overall job quality of Japanese 
workers over the last twenty five years in general and during Japan’s Lost Decade in particular. 
We have demonstrated that seemingly conclusive evidence in support of the conventional 
wisdom turns out to be less definitive once we take into consideration Japan’s self-employment 
sector which was sizable initially and then has been shrinking steadily over time. Specifically  
we have found no evidence on the long-term deterioration of overall job quality for the male 
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population. Perhaps most intriguing is that Japan’s Lost Decade did not cause any shift of male 
employment toward “bad jobs”.  However, the composition of female employment appeared to 
have shifted significantly toward “bad jobs”, and such a shift occurred primarily through an 
increased use of a hybrid employment contract of nonstandard employment on indefinite (open-
ended) contracts. Nonetheless, a closer look at the data (including self-employment) has revealed 
that the increasing use of the hybrid contracts (nonstandard employment on indefinite contracts) 
does not necessarily mean the decreasing use of standard employment contracts, and that the 
most notable compositional change in female employment turned out to be a shift of female 
employment from self-employment to nonstandard employment on indefinite contracts. Our 
regression analysis has yielded evidence suggesting that the compositional shift of female 
employment from self-employment to nonstandard employment on indefinite contracts is likely 
to be a shift from “bad jobs” to “bad jobs”.     
 Overall, our analysis casts doubt on the popular narrative that Japanese employment has 
been shifting toward “bad jobs” over 1982-2007. However, insofar as youth is concerned, we 
have found evidence in favor of the popular narrative, indeed—youth employment shifted 
significantly toward “bad jobs” during Japan’s Great Recession (1992-2002). Particularly young 
women in Japan made considerable progress in shifting the composition of their employment 
toward “good jobs” during Japan’s growth decade preceding the Lost Decade. Unfortunately our 
evidence indicates that such progress was entirely undone during the Great Recession.       
 Let us conclude by discussing some policy implications. First, one of the most powerful 
narratives about the evolution of the Japanese labor market is the rising importance of the 
secondary segment with bad jobs characterized by low wages, weak job security, and limited 
scope for training and career development. Such long-term deterioration of job quality of 
Japanese workers caused by rigid labor market segmentation has been blamed for a number of 
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key challenges that Japan faces, including rising income inequality, poverty, and stagnant 
fertility rate (see, for instance, Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2013). Our study 
cautions that in designing policy responses to issues surrounding labor market segmentation, 
policy makers ought to include the self-employment sector in their scope of policy-making.   
Specifically we have shown that the most important compositional shift of employment in Japan 
over the last twenty five years appears to be a shift from self-employment to a hybrid form of 
employment (non-standard employment yet on indefinite contracts) rather than a shift from 
standard employment to non-standard employment as the popular narrative suggests. The precise 
nature of such a shift remains unknown yet our preliminary analysis suggests that the shift from 
self-employment to non-standard employment on indefinite contracts may not represent the 
deterioration of job quality. More data and rigorous analysis of the nature, causes and effects of 
the transition from self-employment to non-standard employment are urgently needed.  To this 
end, we have built on the methodology developed by the literature on polarization (e.g., Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane, 2002; and Autor and Dorn, 2013) and have explored globalization as a 
possible culprit for the documented compositional shifts of the Japanese labor market, and have 
found some evidence in support of the role of globalization (import) as an underlying force.  
A quick comparison of OECD harmonized unemployment rates among major advanced 
economies over the last twenty five years gives us an impression that Japan has done rather well 
in terms of the quantity of jobs in general and has weathered her own Great Recession in 
particular. When we go beyond the quantity of jobs and start analyzing the quality of jobs, 
however, a more nuanced assessment of the labor market outcome emerges – heterogeneous 
labor market effects of the Great Recession.   
 For policy makers who are concerned about the long-term effect on the labor market of 
the recent financial crisis and ensuing global Great Recession, Japan’s Lost Decade offers a 
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valuable lesson. Obviously the Great Recession affects the quantity of jobs, and policy makers 
ought to pay immediate attention to such quantity effects. It is, however, quite plausible that the 
Great Recession may have more long-term structural effects on the nature and quality of jobs. 
Such quality effects may appear only after a long gestation period and can be difficult to detect. 
Nonetheless precisely because of their potentially profound consequences for the wellbeing of 
workers and the society, policy makers may need to be particularly cognizant of the long-term 
effects of the Great Recession on the structure of the labor market in general and any shifts of the 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for Probit Analysis of Job Loss in 2007 
 observation mean 
jobloss 151208 0.037  
fixedterm 151208 0.071  
nonstandard 151208 0.212  
female 151208 0.393  
age 151208 37.846  
age2/100 151208 15.358  
ten0to4 151208 0.284  
ten5to9 (base) 151208 0.219  
ten10to14 151208 0.139  
ten15+ 151208 0.358  
juniorhigh (base) 151208 0.061  
highschool 151208 0.621  
juniorcollege 151208 0.091  
university 151208 0.227  
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.  
Note: The sample consists of all job holders aged 18 to 54 as of October, 2006. For variable definitions, 




Table 2 Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Job Loss Probability in 2007: All employees 
Dependent Variable: Jobloss=1 if the employee lost a job during the previous year, 0 otherwise 
  Coeff. s.e.   M.E. s.e.   
fixedterm 0.053  0.023  ** 0.003  0.002  ** 
nonstandard 0.208  0.018  *** 0.014  0.001  *** 
female -0.051  0.017  *** -0.003  0.001  *** 
age 0.072  0.005  *** 0.004  0.000  *** 
age2 -0.083  0.007  *** -0.005  0.000  *** 
ten0to4 0.309  0.017  *** 0.022  0.001  *** 
ten10to14 -0.053  0.022  ** -0.003  0.001  ** 
ten15+ -0.332  0.021  *** -0.019  0.001  *** 
highschool -0.045  0.024  * -0.003  0.002  * 
juniorcollege -0.044  0.032  
 
-0.003  0.002  
 university -0.120  0.030  *** -0.007  0.002  *** 
obs 151208 
obs prob 0.037  
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. The omitted tenure category is 5-9 years of tenure (ten5to9). The omitted educational attainment category is 
junior high school or less. Firm size, industry, occupation and location are also controlled for.  




Table 3 Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Job Loss Probability in 2007: Male employees 
Dependent Variable: Jobloss=1 if the employee lost a job during the previous year, 0 otherwise 
  Coeff. s.e.   M.E. s.e.   
fixedterm 0.122  0.042  *** 0.007  0.003  *** 
nonstandard 0.218  0.031  *** 0.013  0.002  *** 
age 0.077  0.008  *** 0.004  0.000  *** 
age2 -0.083  0.010  *** -0.004  0.001  *** 
ten0to4 0.314  0.024  *** 0.019  0.002  *** 
ten10to14 -0.114  0.031  ** -0.005  0.001  ** 
ten15+ -0.426  0.028  *** -0.021  0.001  *** 
highschool -0.035  0.031    -0.002  0.002    
juniorcollege -0.044  0.057    -0.002  0.003    
university -0.107  0.037  *** -0.005  0.002  *** 
obs 91769 
obs prob 0.031  
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. The omitted tenure category is 5-9 years of tenure (ten5to9). The omitted educational attainment category is 
junior high school or less. Firm size, industry, occupation and location are also controlled for.  




Table 4 Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Job Loss Probability in 2007: Female employees 
Dependent Variable: Jobloss=1 if the employee lost a job during the previous year, 0 otherwise 
  Coeff. s.e.   M.E. s.e.   
fixedterm 0.033  0.027    0.003  0.002    
nonstandard 0.223  0.023  *** 0.018  0.002  *** 
age 0.072  0.008  *** 0.006  0.001  *** 
age2 -0.090  0.010  *** -0.007  0.001  *** 
ten0to4 0.295  0.024  *** 0.025  0.002  *** 
ten10to14 0.029  0.033    0.002  0.003    
ten15+ -0.195  0.034  *** -0.014  0.002  *** 
highschool -0.035  0.040    -0.003  0.003    
juniorcollege -0.032  0.046    -0.002  0.003    
university -0.102  0.052  ** -0.007  0.003  ** 
obs 59439 
obs prob 0.046  
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. The omitted tenure category is 5-9 years of tenure (ten5to9). The omitted educational attainment category is 
junior high school or less. Firm size, industry, occupation and location are also controlled for.  






Table 5 OLS Estimates on the effects on log of hourly wage of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on the standard employment track over 



















Source: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm 
size, and location. Standard errors in parentheses.  
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
Dependent variable ln (hourly wage) 
fixedterm 
-0.034 *** 0.004 0.000 0.015 *** 0.001 0.018 *** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
nonstandard 
-0.160 *** -0.173 *** -0.227 *** -0.256 *** -0.220 *** -0.208 *** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
female -0.391 *** -0.365 *** -0.373 *** -0.351*** -0.331 *** -0.292 *** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 310930 312896 405155 393614 342259 346561 
Adj. R-squared 0.587 0.568 0.562 0.556 0.522 0.461 
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Table 6 OLS OLS Estimates on the effects on log of hourly wage of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on the standard employment track 
















Source: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm 
size, and location. Standard errors in parentheses.  
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
Dependent variable ln (hourly wage) 
fixedterm 
-0.047 *** -0.019 *** -0.035 *** -0.011 ** -0.002 0.032 *** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
nonstandard 
-0.110 *** -0.122 *** -0.135 *** -0.187 *** -0.196 *** -0.221 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 209643 207336 260917 253691 217403 214729 
Adj. R-squared 0.545 0.539 0.525 0.529 0.508 0.460 
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Table 7. OLS Estimates on the effects on log of hourly wage of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on the standard employment track over 
















Source: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm 
size, and location. Standard errors in parentheses.  
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
Dependent variable ln (hourly wage) 
fixedterm 
-0.033 *** -0.008 -0.015 *** -0.009 * -0.020 *** -0.012 ** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
nonstandard 
-0.160 *** -0.151 *** -0.228 *** -0.243 *** -0.213 *** -0.185 *** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 101287 105560 144238 139923 124856 131832 
Adj. R-squared 0.432 0.421 0.427 0.434 0.412 0.351 
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Table 8 Probit Estimates on the marginal effects on the incidence of company-sponsored training of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on 






















Source: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm 
size, location, hourly wage, annual hours worked, and intention to quit. Standard errors in parentheses.  




Prob (participation in company-








female -0.007 *** 
   (0.002) 
Observations 345238 
Pseudo R-squared 0.139  
Obs. Probability 0.417  
Predicted Probability 0.403  
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Table 9 Probit Estimates on the marginal effects on the incidence of company-sponsored training of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on 




















Source: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm 
size, location, hourly wage, annual hours worked, and intention to quit. Standard errors in parentheses.  





Prob (participation in company-









Pseudo R-squared 0.116  
Obs. Probability 0.425  
Predicted Probability 0.414  
39 
 
Table 10 Probit Estimates on the marginal effects on the incidence of company-sponsored training of being on fixed-term contracts and being not on 




















Source: the Employment Status Survey, 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm 
size, location, hourly wage, annual hours worked, and intention to quit. Standard errors in parentheses.  
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level. 
  
Dependent variables 
Prob (participation in company-









Pseudo R-squared 0.187 
Obs. Probability 0.404 
Predicted Probability 0.384 
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Table 11 OLS Estimates on the effects on log of hourly earnings of being a nonstandard employee on an indefinite contract vs. being self-employed 
over 1982-2007: women 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1982 1987 1992 2002 2007 
dependent variable ln(hourly earnings) 
nonstandard and fixed-term 
-0.184*** -0.168*** -0.240*** -0.217*** -0.186*** 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
nonstandard and indefinite 
-0.202*** -0.165*** -0.244*** -0.232*** -0.196*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
standard and fixed-term -0.102*** -0.130*** -0.103*** -0.231*** -0.262*** 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.029) 
self-employed 
-0.299*** -0.270*** -0.188*** -0.272*** -0.429*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
# of obs 131672 134009 178286 149678 149918 
ajdusted R-sq 0.447 0.4301 0.4193 0.4153 0.407 
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: age, age2, tenure, tenure2, education, industry, occupation, firm 
size, and location. Standard errors in parentheses.  

















indefinite contract 37.03  0.33  0.17  2.79  40.31  
fixed contract  0.23  4.56  0.03  1.04  5.87  
self-employed 0.09  0.04  14.48  0.49  15.10  
Non-employment 2.64  1.32  0.48  34.28  38.72  
total 40.00  6.24  15.16  38.60  100.00  




Table 13 Fixed Effect Estimates of the Relationship between Share of Non-standard employees and Globalization: Import 
 
Sources: the Employment Status Survey (ESS), 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007, Japan Industrial Productivity Database 2015 (JIP 2015), Career Matrix 
complied by JILPT (CMX), and Population Census 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: share of routine tasks; year effects; and job fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at job in parentheses.  





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
sample 1st bin 2nd bin 3rd bin 4th bin 5th bin 1st bin 2nd bin 3rd bin 4th bin 5th bin
share of self-employed -0.545 *** -0.247 -0.418 *** -0.452 ** -0.143 **
(0.181) (0.167) (0.062) (0.180) (0.065)
import 0.110 ** 0.095 *** -0.193 -0.047 -0.013 0.070 * 0.082 *** 0.049 -0.043 -0.008
(0.048) (0.014) (0.167) (0.061) (0.015) (0.038) (0.020) (0.100) (0.058) (0.015)
ln( IT stock per worker) -0.007 -0.012 -0.001 -0.026 ** 0.042 ** -0.014 -0.001 -0.001 -0.019 * 0.041 *
(0.017) (0.020) (0.029) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.010) (0.022)
ln( non-IT stock per worker) 0.028 -0.062 * -0.058 -0.041 -0.048 ** 0.004 -0.074 ** -0.046 -0.031 -0.041
(0.023) (0.035) (0.055) (0.057) (0.023) (0.011) (0.033) (0.030) (0.049) (0.025)
R-squared 0.8832 0.9478 0.9298 0.9166 0.8759 0.9236 0.9512 0.964 0.9285 0.8791
# of observation 295 190 140 263 335 295 190 140 263 335
# of job 61 38 28 56 67 61 38 28 56 67
FE
job by year
Share of Non-standard Employees
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Table 14 Fixed Effect Estimates of the Relationship between Share of Non-standard employees and Globalization: Export 
estimation method FE 
unit of observation job by year 
dependent variable share of defacto nonstandard employees 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
sample 1st bin 2nd bin  3rd bin  4th bin  5th bin  1st bin  2nd bin  3rd bin  4th bin  5th bin  
share of self-employed          -0.665 *** -0.248  -0.427 *** -0.453 ** -0.139  
          (0.195)  (0.168)  (0.050)  (0.180)  (0.065)  
export 0.238 -0.418 * -0.101  -0.037  -0.169  0.520 *** -0.303  0.254 ** -0.056  -0.154  
 (0.159) (0.238)  (0.447)  (0.242)  (0.103)  (0.156)  (0.224)  (0.110)  (0.249)  (0.108)  
ln( IT stock per worker) -0.005 -0.010  0.009  -0.028 ** 0.041 ** -0.018 * 0.000  -0.005  -0.020 ** 0.041  
 (0.018) (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.012)  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.021)  
ln( non-IT stock per worker) 0.028 -0.049  -0.088 * -0.041  -0.048 ** 0.003  -0.064 * -0.042 * -0.031  -0.041  
 (0.028) (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.057)  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.037)  (0.022)  (0.049)  (0.024)  
R-squared 0.8832 0.9478  0.9298  0.9166  0.8759  0.9236  0.9512  0.964  0.9285  0.8791  
# of observation 295 190  140  263  335  295  190  140  263  335  
# of job 61 38  28  56  67  61  38  28  56  67  
Sources: the Employment Status Survey (ESS), 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007, Japan Industrial Productivity Database 2015 (JIP 2015), Career Matrix 
complied by JILPT (CMX), and Population Census 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: share of routine tasks; year effects; and job fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at job in parentheses.  




Table 15 Fixed Effect Estimates of the Relationship between Share of Non-standard employees and Globalization: Import and Export 
estimation method FE 
unit of observation job by year 
dependent variable share of defacto nonstandard employees 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
sample 1st bin  2nd 
bin 
 3rd bin 4th bin  5th bin  1st bin  2nd 
bin 
 3rd bin  4th bin  5th bin  
share of self-employed          -0.611 *** -0.204  -0.421 *** -0.452 ** -0.139 ** 
          (0.197)  (0.152)  (0.058)  (0.180)  (0.066)  
import 0.107 ** 0.103 *** -0.277 -0.047  -0.006  0.050  0.090 *** -0.052  -0.041  -0.001  
 (0.050)  (0.017)  (0.196) (0.059)  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.021)  (0.145)  (0.058)  (0.014)  
export 0.073  -0.470 * 0.256 0.006  -0.163  0.420 ** -0.369  0.316  -0.018  -0.152  
 (0.194)  2.000   (0.511) (0.236)  (0.098)  (0.191)  1.680   (0.195)  (0.252)  (0.103)  
ln( IT stock per worker) -0.008  -0.010  -0.006 -0.041 * 0.042 * -0.018  -0.002  -0.007  -0.031 * 0.041 * 
 (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.032) (0.012)  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.021)  
ln( non-IT stock per worker) 0.029  -0.049  -0.050 -0.041  -0.048 * 0.005  -0.062 * -0.036  -0.031  -0.041 * 
 (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.056) (0.057)  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.031)  (0.034)  (0.049)  (0.024)  
R-squared 0.898  0.955  0.933 0.917  0.876  0.924  0.951  0.964  0.929  0.879  
# of observation 295  190  140 263  335  295  190  140  263  335  
# of job 61  38  28 56  67  61  38  28  56  67  
Sources: the Employment Status Survey (ESS), 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007, Japan Industrial Productivity Database 2015 (JIP 2015), Career Matrix 
complied by JILPT (CMX), and Population Census 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.  
Notes: For variable definitions, please see the text. All regressions include the following controls: share of routine tasks; year effects; and job fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at job in parentheses.  








Figure 1 Size of the Secondary Segment of the Japanese Labor Market as a Percentage of Total Employment  
over the last 25 years: Using two alternative definitions  
 
Source: the Labor Force Survey. The data on the proportion of the secondary segment employment using the de jure definition are 
from Basic Tabulation Historical Data 4. The data on the proportion of the secondary segment employment using the de facto 




































































Figure 2 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 18-70 in Japan: 1982-2007 
 
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.  
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Figure 3 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 18-70 in Japan: 1982-2007 and male 
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Figure 4 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 18-70 in Japan: 1982-2007 and female 
 
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.  
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Figure 5 Scatter Diagram with Δ%Nonstandard Employment with Indefinite Contracts over 1982-2002 and Δ%Self-employment over 
1982-2002 for Different Industries 
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Figure 6 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 22-30 in Japan: 1982-2007 
 
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.  
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Figure 7 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 22-30 in Japan: 1982-2007 and male 
 
Source: the Employment Status Survey, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.  
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Figure 8 Different categories of workers as percentages of the population aged 22-30 in Japan: 1982-2007 and female
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Appendix A the construction of task score 
 
The task score is from Career Matrix complied by JILPT (CMX). While the original score is 
measured for each detailed occupation (280 occupation), we aggregate this score into one-digit 
occupation by using 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 population census; namely, when we 
define task score for each 3-digit occupation k as 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 from CMX, the aggregated task 
score for each job 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as  
 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡ � 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is the size of 3-digit occupation in employment in year t which is obtained from 
Population Census (Long-term table No.9).  
 
The original score of CMX is a vector of 35 tasks. We then convert the 35 tasks into Non-routine 
Analytical task (NA), Non-routine Interactive task (NI), Routine-Cognitive task (RC), Routine-
Manual task (RM), and Non-routine Manual task (NM) as typically done in the literature.  
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